Charles de Gaulle : the warrior as statesman by Williams, Andrew
 1 
Charles De Gaulle: The Warrior as Statesman 
 
Andrew Williams 
University of St Andrews, UK 
 
ABSTRACT: De Gaulle is primarily remembered as the leader of ‘Free France’ between 1940 
and 1945, as well as for his time as President of the Fourth and Fifth Republics. This paper 
explores some of the sources of his political belief system, using his military writings of the 
1920s and 1930s before he became a celebrated politician. It suggests that his political 
views can only be understood as being influenced by his experiences as a soldier and his 
reflections thereon in those military writings. 
  
 
[A personal note] There is a copious literature about the subject of this paper, French leader 
General Charles de Gaulle, a statesman, soldier and architect of global politics the like of 
which there have been very few in the lifetime of the man this volume celebrates. A.J.R. 
(John) Groom. John has often spoken to me about de Gaulle and I think it fitting that we 
celebrate them both together. John’s attachment to France is legendary and it is largely 
through him that I became obsessed with the often fraught, but always fascinating, cultural, 
historical and political relationship between Britain and France, and through him also that I 
participated in attempting to deepen academic ties between the two countries. Lastly it was 
through him also that I met so many wonderful French academics who have since become 
firm friends. I would like this paper to be seen as a joint tribute to the Greatest Frenchman 
and, in my view, one of the greatest English scholars of International Relations of my career 
span, if not lifetime.    
 
Introduction 
 
Much of the analysis of the life of de Gaulle has appeared in the form of biography or semi – 
biography. These biographers of de Gaulle are many, with the long-standing doyen being 
Jean Lacouture. Other, more recent, writers like Sudhir Hazareesingh, have rightly stressed 
the almost mythical nature of the General, the larger than life quality that he both 
encouraged and was conferred on him by detractors, rivals and admirers alike.1  De Gaulle is 
likewise an enigma, especially to ‘Anglo-Saxons’, as the French like to call the Americans and 
British. But he often seems to appear in the history books as a fully formed and largely 
unknown character on 18 June 1940, as the voice of ‘Free France’ on the BBC in London, 
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two days after the establishment of the Vichy government of Marshall Philippe Pétain, a 
man who had earlier in de Gaulle’s career been his mentor and superior officer. Most of the 
writings about de Gaulle, hagiographic and otherwise,2 therefore understandably 
concentrate on his activities as leader of the Free French in London and Algiers, and his 
subsequent periods as President of the French Republic, first the Provisonal Government of 
1944-46 and then the Fourth and Fifth Republics from 1958-1968. 
 
This paper aims to try and show what were the main influences on de Gaulle before 1940 
and suggest how they might have influenced his later thinking on politics and the future of 
France in Europe and the world. To do this I will examine a side of De Gaulle that is often 
neglected, his writings on strategic thinking, most of which pre-date 1940.3 There are few 
extant studies of this thinking in French and English. As the study by Pierre Messmer and 
Alain Larcan points out, ‘his short appeal of 18 June 1940 has done more for his reputation 
[gloire] than [all his books on military matters] put together’.4 It will also attempt to show 
how these writings have a close relationship to the kinds of political decisions and 
institutions with which his reputation is most closely connected, nearly all of which 
happened after 1940. His relentless political pressure on the ‘Big Three’ Allied leaders 
(Prime Minister Winston Churchill, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Marshall Joseph 
Stalin) to have France taken seriously as both a wartime ally and as a participant in the 
planning of the post – war world is one such nexus.5 But it is in the future relationship which 
de Gaulle came to believe was necessary between Germany and France, as well as the 
future of Europe itself where I hope that my remarks will be at least suggestive of the links 
between his military writings and his later thoughts and actions.   
 
Given the constraints of space, I will subsequently sketch out some of de Gaulle’s views 
about the future of Europe after 1945, and show how they most proximately connected to 
his military writings, and especially to his views on Germany. How could France come to 
terms with the enemy of five wars since 1800, while keeping its dignity and independence 
and avoiding the seemingly eternal cycle of revenge and reparation? If there had been 
enough space, I could also have looked at his attitude towards what became known as the 
‘Third World’, often in disagreement with the ‘Anglo – Saxon’ Powers (Britain and the 
United States), though space is lacking to do it properly in this short paper. In particular de 
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Gaulle was a major player in a very different view of post - war decolonisation, with his 
support for the notion of ‘non –alignment’, as well as with his views on the necessity for a 
rapprochement with Communist states like the USSR, China and Vietnam.6  
 
So the central question here is to what extent we can see the principles of De Gaulle’s pre –
war musings, which Lacouture rightly calls his period as ‘The Rebel’ (1890-1944) being 
carried through into his post – war reincarnation as ‘The Ruler’ (1945 -1970), even if the two 
categories are of course not fully in coincidence with his periods of major influence. After 
all, De Gaulle was only a ‘Rebel’ for the Vichy Government in France of 1940-44, not for 
many millions of French and other admirers. Equally he was not any kind of ‘Ruler’ between 
1946 and 1958, though he came back in triumph in the latter year.7 
 
Charles De Gaulle: ‘mystic’ or ‘politician’? 
 
This fascination with de Gaulle has varied in intensity over the years, often in line with 
whether his views are seen as vieux jeu [old hat] or because he has returned to fashion as a 
visionary, a man way in advance of his time. A bit like his roughly exact contemporary Jean – 
Paul Sartre (1905 – 1980),8 he has been alternately feted, ridiculed or ignored, though 
neither man would have liked the comparison. They may also both suffer from having been 
(largely) correct, reminding lesser mortals of the inadequacies of their tunnel vision, but 
alienating them by the seeming arrogance of their expression of this truth. This was a 
problem acknowledged by de Gaulle himself. When the founder of the nationalist 
movement Action Française supporter of Vichy, Charles Maurras, was being tried for having 
collaborated with the Germans after the war de Gaulle is said to have commented that he 
had been driven ‘fou à cause de toujours avoir raison’ [‘driven mad by always being right’]. 
And the French novelist Claude Mauriac recounts how de Gaulle’s’ successor as French 
President Georges Pompidou in 1970 said that ‘on n’a jamais raison contre l’Histoire… il faut 
encore que les évenéments vous donnent raison’ [one is never right against history… 
[subsequent] events have to prove you were right’].9 In both cases they were right or wrong 
according to historical circumstance. But de Gaulle believed he was right nearly all the time, 
he had ‘une certaine idée de la France’. So where did he get it from? 
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De Gaulle and Sartre certainly represent in the public consciousness, both within and 
outside France, the quintessence of what France has contributed to Western civilisation 
since the First World War. But whereas Sartre, and fellow intellectuals, and occasional 
friends, Albert Camus and Raymond Aron fought about ideas and created the hip 
Montparnasse culture so beloved of would – be ‘existentialists’, de Gaulle moved on a far 
more elevated stage of the theory and practice of war, peace and statesmanship. In all of 
these he excelled, alternately delighting and enraging a global audience over a thirty-year 
period from 1940 to his death in 1970. It is important to remember that he emerged from 
almost total obscurity, a recently promoted Brigadier in the annihilated French Army to be 
the symbol and reality of a ‘Free’ France that demanded to be readmitted to the top table 
of global politics.  
 
It is the measure of his greatness that these three categories of commentator often held 
him in great esteem and with dismay simultaneously, British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill being maybe the best example of the phenomenon.10 His detractors often went 
further than the use of the epithet ‘mythical’. The Republican Presidential candidate of 1940 
Wendell Willkie was overheard by Free French officials in Washington in late 1942 saying de 
Gaulle was ‘quelque chose entre un politicien et un mystique’ [something between a 
politician and a mystic].11 But whereas being labelled a ‘mystic’ in English was by no means a 
compliment, in French it has a totally different connotation. To quote the seminal French 
political thinker Charles Péguy, ‘tout commence en mystique et finit en politique.’ This could 
be roughly translated as: ‘Mysticism has the ring of truth, dragged through the mud by 
reality’. In the context of a France demoralised by the crushing defeat of 1940, ‘mystique’ 
meant the slim possibility of renewal. Andrew Shennan has written that the defeat of 1940 
‘laid bare a profound national crisis [which] was perceived to permeate every aspect of 
French life-economic, social, demographic, political, even ethical’ and this required a ‘search 
for a new national mystique’.12 De Gaulle seems to provide us with an answer as to how that 
was achieved, a man of the hour. But he was not one that was by any means recognised as 
such by most of France and the world in 1940 and for a long time afterwards. 
 
De Gaulle: Rebel Strategist 
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De Gaulle was above all else a soldier. He served with distinction in the First World War as 
an infantry officer, and was wounded and captured during the Battle of Verdun in 1916, 
spending the rest of the war in captivity in Germany, from which he tried to escape on five  
occasions. But he was a most unusual soldier. As Lacouture puts it, his ‘life [was] lived on 
the fringes of the routine activities even of the prescribed practices, in a country whose 
fragility he continually denounced, and in the bosom of an army that was divided by him in 
person, among others… in [a] constant state of rebellion’. Even as a lieutenant in 1912, in a 
unit commanded by (then) Colonel Philippe Pétain, an advocate ‘of the superiority of fire – 
power over offensive -  a thesis that proved prophetic in 1914’, de Gaulle disagreed with his 
commander. Lacouture reminds us that de Gaulle was ‘in complete intellectual dissidence’ 
with Pétain, ‘fill[ing] his notebooks with praise of movement and attack, they alone being 
decisive in war’. By 1917 he was giving lectures as a prisoner of war criticizing the ‘strategic 
and tactical mistakes of the High Command’. By the time he was asked to teach at the Ecole 
de Guerre in 1924, ‘Captain de Gaulle arrogantly maintain[ed] arguments in favour of tactics 
based on circumstances… not only a heretic but a relapsed heretic’.13 We will see that this 
tradition continued throughout the inter-war period up to and including his major breach of 
discipline by refusing to obey orders by raising the standard of revolt in London in June 
1940. Each step of this ‘heresy’ was elaborated in the works that I will now consider in turn. 
 
For he was also a thinker. Lacouture writes that he was unusual in this respect, as soldiers 
generally are not ‘intellectuals’, even in France. And if we add to that the observation that 
de Gaulle was also a soldier who stood up to the top echelons of the military hierarchy in his 
obstinate refusal to accept their views on warfare and strategy, as a lecturer at the Ecole de 
Guerre, it is evident that he was not the average officer. His works of the inter – war period, 
of which the most important are Le discorde chez l’ennemi (1924), Le Fil de l’épée (1932), 
Vers l’armée de metier (1934) and La France et son armée (1938) 14 are without parallel in 
the period by a serving officer, with the exception of General Heinz Guderian, who served 
throughout the Second World War as the preeminent German expert on armoured warfare, 
summed up in his book of 1937, Achtung Panzer.15 De Gaulle’ s views of the period also 
mirror British strategists Captain Basil Liddell Hart (who retired from the army in 1927) and 
General J.F.C. Fuller (who retired from the army in 1933).16 
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 Le discorde chez l’ennemi, 1924 
 
After his return from imprisonment in Germany and then a spell fighting with the Polish 
forces resisting the Bolshevik advance in the early 1920s, de Gaulle was enrolled at the Ecole 
de Guerre, traditionally the precursor to becoming a higher-ranking Staff Officer. He was not 
popular with many of his superiors as he never minced his words in criticizing the conduct of 
the war. In his passing out marks he was only given a note of assez bien (like being given a 
B– or a 2:2 Honours degree in Britain) putting him low on the list. His refusal to agree with 
those who taught him was a clear signal that he had to be reined in. But his saviour turned 
out to be his earlier commanding officer, Pétain, who was now not only the venerated 
Marshall and Victor of Verdun but also the ‘very virtuous chief of the army’s department of 
higher education’. His marks were reviewed and increased to ‘bien’.17 De Gaulle was of 
course to later to condemn the Marshall to death for treason. 
 
Discorde starts with an amazing admission, in the context of 1924, when French armies had 
just re-invaded the Ruhr to enforce the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. De Gaulle’s 
first sentence exhorts his reader to ‘rendre à nos ennemis l’hommage qu’ils ont mérité par 
l’energie des chefs et les efforts des executants [and] l’étenue exceptionelle de qualités de 
guerre qu’ils montrèrent, d’un bout à l’autre du drame’ [‘pay proper homage to our enemy 
who has demonstrated the exceptional and warlike energy of its leaders and its soldiers 
throughout a long struggle’]. He thereby implicitly criticised the failing of France’s own 
‘chefs’ and ‘executants’. The German generals are praised to the skies for their abilities as 
commanders, as are the German people for their moral strength – both factors will 
assuredly obtain ‘l’hommage de l’histoire.’ But his praise was not without a sting, for he 
goes on to explain why the German army, for all its strengths, was nonetheless eventually 
defeated. Lacouture sums this up as being that de Gaulle stresses ‘the necessity of placing 
the “management of the war” entirely in the hands of the political power’. Because Admiral 
Tirpitz and General Ludendorff, respectively heads of the German navy and army ‘’tried to 
impose their own “direction of the war” on the civil power […] they doomed the [German] 
Empire to ruin’.18  
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Most analyses of this book tend to stop there. But maybe the most interesting commentary 
is on the campaigns that de Gaulle analyses, and particularly the discussion of the 
differences between the attitude of Helmut von Moltke (the Elder), the German 
Commander in Chief of the Austrian and French campaigns of 1866 and 1870, and that of 
the Commander in 1914 on the Western Front, also called Helmut von Moltke (hence ‘the 
Younger’), the nephew of the Great Man. In the first case the victory was assumed to have 
been won by a commander who let his subordinate generals do what they liked within the 
broad aims of the campaign, up to and including disobeying direct orders, and the 
commander of 1914 who was considered to be, according to de Gaulle, as ‘laborious and 
learned [instruit] and, wrongly or rightly, considered by his ambitious and inconvenient 
[incommode] lieutenants, as only semi-energetic, indeed ailing’. The ghost of von Moltke 
the Elder, who had gloried in not being able to issue orders in the middle of the Battle of 
Sedan by only having one horse-mounted aide de camp available, and he perfectly able to 
fall off his horse, dominated thinking in 1914. But in 1870 de Gaulle wrote that the only 
French general against whom the Prussians were measured was the ‘systematically inert 
Marshall Bazaine’, while in 1914 the German forces were up against a much better French 
general in Joffre. The result was the glorious and improbable French victory on the Marne 
which in effect sealed Germany’s fate, even if it took four years for this to become apparent. 
As in 1870 the German High Command had made a virtue of letting German forces do their 
own thing. But this time the High Command had, albeit primitive, aerial reconnaissance that 
pointed to a huge French build up and flanking movement on the Marne. Such was the 
weight of history that von Moltke the Younger did nothing with this intelligence and the 
German General that was about to be outflanked, Von Kluck, refused to believe that the 
French had any such advantage.  De Gaulle explains this seeming idiocy by seeing the 
dangers of, first, the reliance on historical precedent, and, second, the post-1870 writings of 
Friedrich Nietzsche. This had made every German officer ‘as in all of thinking Germany’ 
believe that he was a ‘superman… thus disposing each of them to see himself as being the 
centre of the world’. The dangers of historical and personal hubris were thus allied to the 
dangers of relying on the intellect. The lesson was not learned, as von Moltke the Younger’s 
successor Erich von Falkenhayn then went on to another reverse at Verdun in 1916, a battle 
in which de Gaulle was both wounded and captured. 
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A similar battle of minds and ideas dominated the other case studies in de Gaulle’s analysis. 
In the second such study, on the declaration of unlimited submarine warfare, he puts the 
responsibility for a suicidal decision to provoke the United States into declaring war on a 
battle between the egos of the weak and vacillating Kaiser Wilhelm II, the founder of the 
Modern German navy Von Tirpitz, and the German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg. The 
latter fully understood the consequences of pushing the United States, which he knew to be 
fundamentally opposed to involvement in Europe’s war, into the conflict. Tirpitz had also 
provoked the formerly friendly Great Britain by his provocative statements and naval 
building programme into seeing Germany after about 1907 as its most likely foe, reversing 
many centuries of cooperation and enmity towards France. When British Secretary for War 
Lord Haldane, one of those most fearful of German rearmament, had proposed a truce on 
naval armaments, von Tirpitz had rebutted the approach, accusing Haldane’s sponsor 
Bethmann of going soft. This personal dislike was aggravated during the war with von Tirpitz 
seeing it as his personal mission to destroy any idea by Bethmann that might have led to 
keeping the USA neutral. The Kaiser ended up supporting the admiral, through sheer 
personal weakness of character. Von Tirpitz used his charisma to whip up nationalist opinion 
in the streets and the Reichstag. The final blow to Bethmann's attempt to moderate the 
party of total war was the Kaiser’s decision to dismiss von Falkenhayn and call the popular 
Marshall von Hindenburg and his deputy Ludendorff to be head of the Army. In effect the 
Reichstag and the Kaiser gave up control of the war to the navy and Hindenburg. This 
abnegation of political responsibility led to the final disaster.19 
 
The two final case studies deploy similar psychological and political analyses to show how 
German commanders relied on their need for promotion and their belief in their 
Nietszchean moral superiority to betray their Allies and to finally topple the only sensible 
German politician in de Gaulle’s opinion, Bethmann-Hollweg. The first of these cases shows 
the supreme hubris of Falkenhayn, who was prepared to sacrifice his Austro-Hungarian 
Allies in his desire to prove his worth at Verdun. The result was a near disaster in the first 
theatre of war and the second a costly and pointless stalemate at Verdun, after which, as 
we have noted, he was dismissed from high command. The second studies the final dive of 
Germany into a military dictatorship, in a very detailed analysis of voting patterns in the 
Reichstag, ‘after which Germany let itself be led by Ludendorff’ and to the ‘collapse of a 
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strong and valiant people’. The ‘moral collapse’ of the German state and population he sees 
as having been a consequence of the collapse of its army, but the roots of this lay in the 
moral defeat of the civil power.20 The parallels to what was to happen in 1940, and again in 
1944, are striking, though even de Gaulle cannot have imagined in 1924 that he would play 
a huge role in re-establishing the moral authority of both the French army and state. 
  
 Le Fil de l’épée, 1932 
 
Independently of de Gaulle, (by now) Marshall Pétain had decided after the war that there 
needed to be both a proper analysis of what had gone right and wrong in the war and how 
the French army might be re-designed to be better prepared for another major conflict. 
Apparently impressed by what he had read of Le discorde chez l’ennemi, sent to him by the 
author, he summoned Captain de Gaulle to see him in early 1925 and told him he would like 
his subordinate to help him write a book on the re-organisation question. Lacouture drily 
remarks that de Gaulle was in effect ‘being called in as a ghost, as the great leader’s pen-
holder… the assistance of the man who was said to be the best writer in the army’. This 
‘assistance’ was a difficult thing to refuse when the request came from the most famous 
soldier in France. He was certainly a bird in a gilded cage, given everything he could 
reasonably require, but de Gaulle quickly chafed under Pétain’s guidance for a book that 
was supposed to be entitled Le Soldat.  When Pétain then decided to go back to active 
service to put down a rebellion in Morocco in August 1925 de Gaulle saw this as a stab in 
the back for the man Pétain replaced, Marshall Lyautey, and the haughty Captain for ever 
more asserted that Pétain ‘died in 1925, and he did not know it’.21  
 
De Gaulle did not consult either Pétain or the then Commander in Chief of the Army 
Maurice Gamelin, when he tried to publish more of his views, in the Revue Militaire 
Française in 1934 but first in the book of 1932 he entitled Le Fil de l’épée [the edge of the 
sword]. The book was based on a series of lectures he gave at the Ecole de Guerre and are a 
summary of de Gaulle’s views on the nature of the soldier, the theme of the proposed book 
with Pétain of course.22 The nature of these lectures was mainly to do with the ideal soldier 
and dwells a great deal on character, and especially that of leaders in war:  
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‘Wishes and hopes turn towards the leader as iron towards the magnet. When the 
crisis comes, it is he who is followed, it is he who raises the burden with his own 
arms… A kind of tidal wave sweeps the man of character to the forefront’.  
 
We have already seen his evolving views on Pétain after 1925 and although he dedicated 
the book to the Marshall a lot of people detected a great arrogance, even insolence, 
towards his patron in the book.  It comes over more as an ‘essay’ than as a book, as 
Messmer and Larcan point out, and one that they stress was written in a very classical style, 
to the point where de Gaulle has been described (here citing Claude Roy) as the ‘last French 
writer to write in Latin’.23 But its intentions are very clear. He was using the forum of the 
Ecole de Guerre itself to criticise the leadership of the army. Maybe he was even saying that 
the leader of 1916 was no match for the new challenges of the 1930s?  
 
Vers l’armée de metier, 1934 
 
De Gaulle believed in a far more radical approach to military reform than Pétain. The latter’s 
experience at Verdun had taught him above all the benefits of a strong defensive line, one 
on which he believed any enemy could be broken. Such had been his experience at Verdun 
in 1916. And in 1916 he had been right, though his support in the late 1920s for a frontier 
length version of this principle was clearly with hindsight mistaken. The Maginot Line, 
practically complete by 1939, was of no use against a flanking armoured attack, as de Gaulle 
came to realise.24 Neither was it enough to rely on the old ideas of conscription that had 
provided France with its waves of infantry at Verdun and beyond. By 1934 de Gaulle was 
convinced that what was needed was une armée de métier,25 a professional army. In so 
suggesting he not only upset the Marshall, he also upset the ‘republican’ generals like the 
main commander in chief for most of the 1930s, General Gamelin. Even though there were 
precedents in Republican circles for army reform, most famously Socialist leader Jean 
Jaurès’s L’armée nouvelle,26 that book urged a renewal of the French revolutionary tradition 
of 1789 in a levée en masse, a combination of ‘military and moral force’, and most decidedly 
against what Jaurès termed ‘Napoleonic tendencies’. Gamelin obviously saw de Gaulle’s 
views in this latter light.27 
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De Gaulle also advocated the development of the tank and of offensive aircraft in the mid to 
late 1930s, weapons that had been used a bit like the machine gun at Sedan in 1870, as an 
isolated support for the infantry. As with the machine gun in the First World War, for de 
Gaulle it had become apparent that tanks and aircraft needed to be used in conjunction and  
en masse, which also presupposed the opposite of the Maginot mentality, a return to the 
dominance of the offensive. As a number of writers have pointed out, however, the French 
armaments industry was neither capable, or often even willing, to provide the necessary 
hardware. Partly this was as a result of the dire industrial relations in French industry 
generally in the 1930s, partly it was due to the chaotic nature of the politics of the Third 
Republic, and partly it was due to the economics of production. It was far more profitable 
for Messieurs Citroen and Renault to produce high – value motor cars than expensive 
prototype tanks. The French Ministers for Air before 1940, Pierre Cot and Guy La Chambre, 
were not able to galvanise the various French Governments in which they served to 
prioritise plane manufacture and the United States’ Neutrality Acts made such production 
for a foreign Power problematic in any case.  
 
Martin Alexander shows how French tanks were as good as any the Germans were able to 
produce but they were badly deployed and in too few number to count, except in a famous 
engagement in 1940 near the highly symbolic Chemin des Dames led by Brigadier Charles de 
Gaulle.28 Certainly the 1936 French Military Manual saw tanks as being used to support 
infantry and it was only in 1939 that two brigades of tanks were allowed to be deployed as 
were the German panzers, as independent units, too little and too late.29 There is an 
interesting academic dispute about how ignorant of the necessities of tank warfare the 
French (and British) High Commands really were, that pits Douglas Porch against Elizabeth 
Keir. It is fair to say that Keir’s views, that the Generals rather neglected the right kind of 
tank warfare, would have probably got de Gaulle’s vote. Alexander defends the Generals, 
especially Gamelin, whom he says have been treated to post facto criticism that ignores 
their domestic constraints.  
 
More seriously, Alexander also criticises de Gaulle, whom he believes ‘showed no special 
clairvoyance towards military applications of aviation. … and offered no doctrine of air-
armour coordination’ in l’armée de metier.30 In the febrile atmosphere after the Second 
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World War, such understandings on occasion led to law suits. Alfred Fabre-Luce, a 
prominent French journalist who stayed in France during the occupation (and wrote a 
celebrated series of Journals de la France, 1940-44) was critical of de Gaulle’s stance in 1940 
and was imprisoned by both the Vichy and Resistance authorities for his ambivalence. But 
he went too far when he accused de Gaulle in 1962 of not understanding at the time the 
need for armour and air power. De Gaulle’s lawyers took him to trial for, in effect, lèse 
majesté towards the President for saying so. The significance of this lies much less in the 
truth of the accusation than in the importance that the myth of de Gaulle in the resurrection 
of France had come to assume by 1962.31 When de Gaulle talked about ‘une certaine idée de 
la France’ that idea had come to mean his person and the stories he told. Fabre-Luce, who 
accepted the French defeat with more or less good grace in 1940, incarnated a France that 
de Gaulle felt he had defeated.32 
 
 La France et son armée, 1938 
 
Even before 1940, de Gaulle was creating his own mythology, and his military writings have 
to also be seen in that light. Unlike his earlier books, La France et son armée, of 1938, pays 
homage to a different French hero from his Le fil de l’épée, no longer Pétain, but rather 
Charles Péguy. Péguy was an intellectual ‘hero’ who was killed on practically the first day of 
the First World War, and is quoted by de Gaulle in the Dedication as saying ‘Mother, see 
your sons, that have fought so hard [for you]’. Péguy will be further referred to below. The 
book is a paean to the French profession of arms back to the Gauls. If French schoolchildren 
were taught in the 1930s about ‘leurs ancètres les Gaullois’, de Gaulle stressed their military 
skills. Again the prose is sonore, the linguistic equivalent of a French cathedral’s vaulted 
ceilings, and that may have put off many Anglo-Saxons unused to such prosody. The book is 
a specialist text, as it was intended to be, but it was also a call to arms and a demand that 
France be proud of herself, a condition which de Gaulle and many others like Gamelin could 
see was sadly not the case in the late 1930s. He correctly saw that ‘France sees itself in the 
mirror of its army’ (reflète fidèlement au miroir de son armée).33  
 
Other Key Influences on de Gaulle 
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Charles Péguy and Henri Bergson 
 
Lacouture believes that before the First World War de Gaulle had certainly read a large 
variety of military writers, notably Clausewitz, but also that he had read a great deal of 
‘civilian’ literature, typical of a ‘young man shaped by a catholic education, intensely 
interested in history, permeated with nationalism and curious about everything’. In 
particular he read Maurice Barrès, as well as the founders of Action Française, the renewers 
of Catholic thought and ‘above all [Charles] Péguy and [Henri] Bergson.’ Péguy, a man from 
a decidedly poor background, was most famous before the First World War as the editor of 
the Cahiers de la Quinzaine, a periodical of great intellectual influence. Péguy is best known 
for his uncompromising attachment to socialism, Catholicism and nationalism, a mixture 
that has given him followers from the Left to the Right of French politics ever since, 
including de Gaulle.34  Péguy greatly admired Bergson, whom he heard lecture while he was 
a student at the prestigious Ecole Normale Supérieure. Bergson was the most important 
French philosopher of the period before the Second World War, an influential lecturer at 
the Sorbonne and the Collège de France (whose lectures anyone can attend) and author of 
many celebrated philosophical texts. As a Jew, he was subject to the Vichy anti – semitic 
laws, a subject of some embarrassment to Vichy Prime Minister Pierre Laval, who asked him 
to accept ‘honorary’ Aryan status. Bergson refused and died of pneumonia after queuing up 
in the rain for his yellow star in January 1941.35    
 
Unlike many other conservative, catholic Frenchmen at that time, De Gaulle did not follow 
Barrès, Charles Maurras and the rest of the French extreme right into the anti-semitic, ultra-
nationalist group who condemned Captain Dreyfus to the horrors of Devil’s Island purely to 
defend the supposed ‘honour’ of the French army. His intellectual revolt against what might 
be termed conservative conformity began even before he became a soldier. Péguy was 
more to his liking, a French nationalist who constantly evoked the great figures of France’s 
past, who would have no truck with socialist pacifism, but was also a supporter of Dreyfus. 
He also admired Bergson’s Evolution créatrice, whose notions of the superiority of intuition 
over intellect he saw as a major reminder of the importance of listening to God and one’s 
instinct. De Gaulle gives Bergson prominence in Le Fil de l’épée, particularly evoking the 
need to trust one’s instinct (or maybe even ‘conscience’?) when faced with a reality that is 
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in constant movement, as well as the problems of being too ‘intelligent’.36 Lacouture points 
out that Bergson is also evoked by de Gaulle in this way in La France et son armée, his most 
lyrical evocation of the glories of French military history. He shared Bergson’s ‘distrust of 
categories and systems’, again stressing the importance of using intuition to make major 
decisions and to be prepared at all times to have to ‘make anew’.37 Such was definitely de 
Gaulle’s calling both as a soldier and as a politician. But it was a calling that supposed a 
higher moral imperative than the mere search after personal power. We can see the power 
of Bergsonian ideas, such as the need to trust instinct and the urge to ‘make anew’ in both 
the Appeal of June 1940 and in the decisions that led to his taking power for the second 
time in 1958. Ayache makes the clear link in his account of that period, for example.38 As we 
suggested above probably the most important aspect that de Gaulle took from Bergson was 
his ability to sense the moment to take a risk, to go with the gut, not the head. This is noted 
by all his biographers.  
 
Other key republican soldiers in the French army before the Second World War also showed 
admiration for Bergson, most notably Gamelin, in 1940 the Commander in Chief of the 
French Army. He was subsequently put on trial in the Riom Trials of 1942 by Pétain for 
having allegedly failed France, along with Socialist Prime Minister Léon Blum (1936-37) and 
Edouard Daladier, Minister of War (1936-40) and Prime Minister (1938-40), and a variety of 
other ministers of the Third Republic. Although both Gamelin and de Gaulle can be 
considered ‘intellectual’ soldiers’39 and both were Dreyfusards, not a popular option among 
young army officers before 1914, as we have seen Gamelin had a frosty relationship with de 
Gaulle, whom he suspected of Boulangist tendencies. But both were cultivated men, and 
both shared a huge admiration for history and Bergson, Gamelin was for his best biographer 
‘[t]he antithesis of the archetypal military philistine’.40 However de Gaulle in effect treated 
him the same way as he had treated Pétain, with more than a dash of contempt. He always 
held Prime Ministers Blum and Paul Reynaud in far greater respect than either of his former 
commanding officers .   
 
Conclusion: Germany and Europe  
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De Gaulle certainly understood the nature of the French nation and of the importance of 
national identity for the French and for other Europeans. That was made clear in his pre-war 
writings about the French army and his many speeches on the topic. As Régis Debray 
pointed out de Gaulle had a clearer understanding of the topic than the French Left,41 and 
that might still be said to be the case, even if it is beyond the scope of this paper. But he 
also played an inordinately important role in the evolution of the European project after the 
war, even if it is doubtful that he would have liked what it has now become.  
 
For at times it did not seem that his sympathies for a European entity were very strong.  In 
the period between January 1946 and his return to power in June 1958, he proclaimed 
himself convinced that Europhile politicians like Jean Monnet, ideological father of 
European unity,  Robert Schumann, the co–founder of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), as well as his former right hand man in Washington René Pleven and the 
signatories of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 were all traitors to France. Another generally 
sympathetic biographer, Ayache, compares his language about the European Defence 
Community (EDC) proposal of 1952 – 1954 (when it was rejected by the French Parliament) 
to the ravings of Captain Haddock in the comic book Tintin. He saw the EDC Treaty as an 
extension of attempts by the United States to control Europe, as they were also trying to do 
through NATO (founded in 1949), in the name of ‘burden-sharing’. It was ‘le suicide de la 
France’ and he called for a return to the Maquis. But for de Gaulle the ‘European’ army that 
Truman and his Secretary of State Dean Acheson envisaged was nothing more than ‘une 
ânerie’ [asinine nonsense]. At that point his considered opinion was also that ‘L’armée 
européenne, c’est l’armée de l’Europe. Or l’Europe n’existe pas en tant qu’entité morale et 
politique.’ [the European army is that of Europe. But Europe does not yet exist].42  
 
But by 1958 he had had a miraculous conversion, his relationship with Konrad Adenauer led 
to one of the greatest political double acts of the Twentieth Century. From then on, 
notwithstanding episodes like the ‘Empty Chair ‘of 1965-66, (when de Gaulle refused to 
engage with EC’s move towards a more supranational organisation) he supported a Europe 
that was ‘l’Europe des nations’. This is a notion that has never disappeared and may indeed 
be said to making a comeback. For de Gaulle never stopped being a French nationalist and a 
believer in a Europe des nations, but he did shed the age-old French distrust of Germany. 
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What he did do was to see Europe as a continent whose politics should evolve in line with 
French and German desires and not one that should in any way be contaminated by British 
or American wishes, often to the alarm of his partners in the EC like Holland and Belgium 
who wanted at all costs to keep the British in Europe. Only after de Gaulle fell from power in 
1969 was there any possibility of a supranational development for European institutions. 
 
So can we really say that de Gaulle’s views as a soldier and man influenced his thinking on 
the international politics of his day, at least in Europe and in his dealings with the United 
States? De Gaulle’s views tended to vacillate like everyone else’s, but there were certain 
constants in his thinking that can be traced back to his own experiences in life, as a soldier in 
particular. Lacouture sees de Gaulle’s changing views as being due to his major ‘muse of 
history’ – when he was thinking of Her and he felt ‘deprived of her lessons, he sometimes 
seemed to vacillate, to be groping his way.’ So, says Lacouture, when faced with the United 
States, he was often confused as ‘he had no “grid” of historical references to deal with’ the 
country. No such doubts existed when dealing with the British as there he had the 
‘bitterness’ born out ‘of excessive attachment to a past in which Hastings, Agincourt, 
Waterloo and Fashoda loomed large’. This was well described in La France et son armée. 
The same was true of Germany and Poland, with which he was not only familiar as a soldier 
but also as a historian. So, adds Lacouture, ‘Germany was in the forefront of [his] thinking.. 
because the community living on either side of the Rhine belonged perfectly to the 
historical setting that inspired the author of Le Fil de l’épée.’43 
  
In addition de Gaulle never lost his admiration for what he had called in Discorde the moral 
strength and military capability of the German people. In his criticism of German tactics in 
1914 – 18 his bile was reserved for the political leadership. This was reinforced by what he 
saw in Germany during his captivity. But what if Germany could find leaders who did not 
abuse the moral strength of the German population but put it to positive use in a good 
cause? In Konrad Adenauer and, post – 1945, other German leaders de Gaulle ultimately 
found the kind of people he could work with. But that was not the case in the immediate 
aftermath of the war, and not really until he became President again after the crisis in 
Algeria and the foundation of the 5th Republic. 
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Certainly he wished to find German leaders who were prepared to create a Franco–German 
Europe, not one tainted by Anglo–Saxon compromises and an excessive intrusion of non-
European Powers, both of which he ascribed to both the United States and Britain, but not 
necessarily to Russia. That he found with Adenauer who he believed understood like him 
that ‘national independence, the construction of Europe, peaceful East-West relations’44 
were all part of the same project. The Transatlantic and Transmanche Cold Warriors did not 
fit with that vision of the world. 
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